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Trust as N oncognitive Security 
about Motives 
Lawrence C. Becker 
My project in this article is to sharpen the distinction between cognitive 
and noncognitive accounts of trust and to argue for the importance 
for political philosophy of pursuing an inquiry into the more neglected 
of the two areas, the noncognitive one. In particular, I will argue for 
the importance of what I will call a sense of security about other 
people's benevolence, conscientiousness, and reciprocity. Apart from 
the rather obvious case to be made for its being a crucial element in 
the formation, stability, and productiveness of both individuals and 
large-scale social organizations, such security raises intriguing empiri-
cal and theoretical problems often obscured in discussions of other 
forms of trust. 
A diverse body of work has prompted these reflections. The proxi-
mate cause was Russell Hardin's analysis of the strategic value of what 
he calls optimistic trust,l together with an early version of his article 
in this issue (pp. 26-42). Those pieces led me to Niklas Luhmann's 
remarks about the "internal" dimension of trust that should not be 
treated merely as "an analogy with cognition" and his more recent 
distinction between trust and confidence.2 These works renewed and 
deepened my appreciation of Annette Baier's arguments against a 
cool, rational, contractarian approach to the subject.3 Judith Baker's 
analysis of forms of trust that are evidence resistant or evidence inde-
pendent, Trudy Govier's emphasis on trust as an attitude, and John 
1. Russell Hardin, "The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust," Analyse und Kritik 14 
(1992): 152-76. 
2. Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, ed. Tom Burns and Gianfranco Poggi, trans. 
Howard Davis, John Raffan, and Kathryn Rooney (New York: Wiley, 1979), p. 79, 
and "Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives," in Trust: Making and 
Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. Diego Gambetta (New York: Blackwell, 1988), pp. 
94-107. 
3. Annette Baier, "Trust and Antitrust," Ethics 96 (1986): 231-60, "Trust and Its 
Vulnerabilities," in her Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1995), pp. 131-51. 
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Dunn's remarks about trust as a "passion," held against James S. Cole-
man's rigorously cognitive account, clarified many matters for me, and 
the various ways in which Toshio and Midori Yamagishi;John Orbell, 
Robyn Dawes, and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea; and Tom R. Tyler and 
Peter Degoey have studied trusting the benevolence and fairness of 
others was suggestive.4 All of this work, however, as I interpret it, is 
ultimately in what I will call the cognitivist tradition and has hardened 
my conviction that it is a particular form of noncognitive trust that 
ought to be of central interest to political philosophers.5 
To fix ideas, let us call our trust "cognitive" if it is fundamentally 
a matter of our beliefs or expectations about others' trustworthiness; 
it is noncognitive if it is fundamentally a matter of our having trustful 
attitudes, affects, emotions, or motivational structures that are not 
focused on specific people, institutions, or groups. I say "fundamen-
tally" because the distinction has a fuzzy boundary.6 Hope, for exam-
ple, though it can be an unfocused attitude, can clearly be a feature 
of cognitive trust if it is directed toward specific people and is causally 
dependent on specific beliefs or expectations about them. When hope 
(like anxiety) lacks an object, however, or is not causally dependent 
on a discrete set of beliefs about an object, it is a feature of noncognitive 
trust. These matters will become clearer as the argument progresses, 
but for the moment it is sufficient to reiterate simply that cognitive 
trust is composed of beliefs or expectations about the future behavior 
of others, in some or all situations. Thus, to assert that A trusts B 
cognitively is to assert something of the form A believes or expects B 
will do X in situation S. Noncognitive trust is composed of attitudes 
of certain sorts, period. To assert that A trusts B noncognitively is to 
4. Judith Baker, "Trust and Rationality," Pacific Philosophical QJmrterly 68 (1987): 
1-13; Trudy Govier, "Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem," Hypatia 8 (1993): 
99-120; John Dunn, Interpreting Political Responsibility (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1990); James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1990); Toshio Yamagishi and Midori Yamagishi, "Trust and 
Commitment in the United States and Japan," Motivation and Emotion 18 (1994): 
129-66; John Orbell, Robyn Dawes, and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, "Trust, Social Cat-
egories, and Individuals: The Case of Gender," Motivation and Emotion 18 (1994): 
109-128; Tom R. Tyler and Peter Degoey, "Trust in Organizational Authorities: The 
Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions," in Trust in Organi-
zational Authorities, ed. R. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler (Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage, in 
press). 
5. Baker's paper is ultimately quite close to my concerns, though not to the way 
I work them out. The same is true of John Deigh, "Morality and Personal Relations," 
in Person to Person, ed. George Graham and Hugh LaFollette (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1989), pp. 106-123, pp. 109 ff.; Olli Lagenspetz, "Legitimacy and 
Trust," Philosophical Investigations 15 (1992): 1-21; and Karen Jones, "Trust as an 
Affective Attitude," in this issue, pp. 4-25. 
6. For a stronger claim, see Baier, "Trust and Its Vulnerabilities," p. 132. 
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assert something of the form Ns attitude (affect, noncognitive disposi-
tion) toward B is X. That is, it is to assert that Ns attitude is trustful 
of (or trusting with) B. 
Cognitive accounts of trust typically treat it as a matter of strategic 
choice, either about individual actions or about dispositions to behave. 
On this view, trust is a way of managing uncertainty in our dealings 
with others by representing those situations as risks. We can do this 
if we develop beliefs or expectations about the trustworthiness of others. 
Some of those beliefs will be about particular people; some will be 
about types of people; still others will constitute an underlying set 
of expectations about people in general. Once we have beliefs and 
expectations about the trustworthiness of others, we can convert un-
certainties about their behavior into an estimate of the risks of dealing 
with them.7 Then the theory of strategic choice can be wheeled se-
curely into place-to discuss not only when it is rational to trust partic-
ular people in particular situations but also whether it is rational to 
be trusting in general. (And, alas, the romance is gone.) 
My interest is in cases in which the residue of uncertainty is objec-
tively very great and where we cannot, or at any rate do not, try to 
convert it into subjective estimates of risk. Those cases are pervasive 
in modern political life, and I want to propose that how we handle 
them-how trusting we are in a noncognitive way-is something polit-
ical theorists should attend to in a more systematic way. 
As a final preliminary, let me define three forms of trust that 
are particularly relevant for present purposes. I define them here as 
motivational traits or dispositions (i.e., forms of noncognitive trust), 
but they obviously have analogues on the cognitive side. I do not mean 
to suggest that the three forms are mutually exclusive. They are often 
tightly interwoven, but they are nonetheless distinct. (Compare Ber-
nard Barber's tripartite distinction.)8 
Credulity.-In some contexts, trust is a matter of credulity: it is a 
disposition to believe what another person says and to banish skeptical 
thoughts. ("Trust," says the promo for NBC Nightly News, over a picture 
of Tom Brokaw. In effect, "You can believe what this man says on a 
newscast.") Let us say that credulity is comprehensive to the extent 
that we are disposed to believe anything anyone says on any topic and 
that it is stable to the extent that it persists no matter how much 
evidence we have of the fallibility of our informants. No doubt it is 
7. Hardin has urged me to reformulate this point in a way that does not depend 
on what may be an empty distinction between uncertainty and risk. We can do this by 
saying that the cognitivist project is to reduce estimated risk to something better than 
chance for each alternative outcome. 
8. Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (New Brunswick, N.].: Rutgers 
University Press, 1983), pp. 9-14. 
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lethal at the limits. It is notable that the extent to which credulity 
may be an unduly neglected element in the theory of knowledge has 
recently generated some debate, some of which relies on the theory 
of strategic rationality.9 
Reliance.-In other contexts, trust is a matter of reliance: it is a 
disposition to depend upon other people in some respect; to banish 
fear of such dependence; to rely, for example, on their competence 
or fidelity. ("Believe you? I don't understand a word you say. But 
go ahead anyway. I trust you.") Reliance, too, can be more or less 
comprehensive and stable, and it is notably unhealthy at the extremes. 
Security. - Finally, in still other contexts, trust is a matter of feeling 
secure: it is a disposition to have confidence about other people's 
motives, to banish suspicious thoughts about them. ("I don't know 
anything about you, but somehow I feel safe with you. I trust you.") 
In developmental psychology, the most fundamental form of this is 
what Erik Erikson called basic trust and what appears in Abraham H. 
Maslow's theory of motivation as the safety needs.1O Karen Horney 
wrote about its pathological counterpart under the heading of basic 
anxiety.ll Basic trust (and distrust) is something we develop in a crude 
form in infancy and continue to refine throughout our lives. Such 
a sense of security, too, can be more or less comprehensive and 
stable, but the most interesting confidence games depend on the 
victim's having a complex mixture of low and high levels of security 
of this sort, as depicted, for example, in films such as The Sting or 
The Grifters. 12 Even for those who take the cynical view that effective 
government is always a con game, then, this form of trust will repay 
close study. 
9. For debate, see John Hardwig, "Epistemic Dependence," Journal of Philosophy 82 
(1985): 335-49, "The Role of Trust in Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 
693 -708; Mark Owen Webb, "Why I Know about as Much as You: A Reply to Hardwig," 
Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 260-70; Jonathan E. Adler, "Testimony, Trust, Know-
ing," Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 264-75. On strategic rationality, see MichaelJ. 
Blais, "Epistemic Tit for Tat," Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 363-75; John Woods, 
"The Maladroitness of Epistemic Tit for Tat," Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 324-31; 
Michael J. Blais, "Misunderstanding Epistemic Tit for Tat: Reply to John Woods," 
Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 369-74. 
10. Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1963), p. 
247; Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 2d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 
1970), pp. 39 H. 
11. Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (New York: Norton, 1937), 
pp. 88 H. 
12. George Roy Hill, director, The Sting (1973), the Paul Newman and Robert 
Redford classic; Stephen Frears, director, The Grifters (1990), elegant, nasty film noir, 
with fine performances by Angelica Huston, John Cusack, Annette Benning, and Pat 
Hingle. 
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ABSTRACTION AND THE ELIMINATION 
OF COGNITIVE TRUST 
47 
Cognitive accounts of trust have a strong hold on us for a variety of 
good reasons. In the first place, it seems impossibly dreamy to trust 
people without regard to their trustworthiness, especially when the 
stakes are high. The conventional wisdom is that political life is a high-
stakes game full of ruthless players. Saintly souls who are persistently 
trustful and serenely indifferent to the treachery around them may 
have a few temporary successes at the margins of such a game, but 
more often they are exploited and pose a danger to themselves and 
others. Such saintly trust is dangerous even in intimate relationships 
because it can elicit, perpetuate, and exacerbate abusive behavior. So 
it is natural to think that our trust should always be a cognitive matter 
in the sense that we should always try to connect it to good estimates 
of others' trustworthiness. Moreover, even when we cannot estimate 
this, our trust should be a cognitive matter in the sense that we should 
monitor its consequences. Thoughts like these rightly make the strate-
gic analysis of trust irresistible. 
That is certainly part of the attraction of cognitive trust for us all, 
but it is not the whole story for political philosophers and social scien-
tists, and it does not adequately reveal a disturbing peculiarity-namely, 
that cognitive accounts of trust appear to eliminate what they say they 
describe. That peculiarity, I think, is what drives (some) theologians, 
poets, narrative artists, and moral philosophers toward noncognitive 
trust. 13 
My contention is that we can see this peculiarity most clearly if 
we focus on the special appeal that cognitive trust has in political, 
social, and economic theory (and journalistic political analysis) when 
we adopt a common simplifying assumption about human motivation: 
the "wide" self-interest assumption. This abstraction is not much used 
in moral philosophy generally, as opposed to its political subdepart-
ment, and for obvious reasons gets short shrift in narrative art. As a 
consequence, in those endeavors we are less apt to give an eliminative 
analysis of trust. 
To support this contention, I need to begin with a distinction 
between the abstract and the concrete in human interactions. Let us 
say that our interactions are abstract insofar as we deal with others in 
general terms-that is, as though they were merely tokens of a given 
type of thing (e.g., constituents, competitors, enemies, men, women, 
children, friends, or lovers). At the limit of such abstraction, a constitu-
ent or a lover is thought of as completely describable in general 
terms-as a replicable instantiation of general properties. In contrast, 
13. For a rather different argument on this point, see Lagenspetz. 
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let us say that our interactions are concrete insofar as we deal with 
others in particular terms-that is, as this or that one, identified, 
but uncategorized, being. At the limit of concreteness, this or that 
constituent or lover is not thought of in even that one general category 
but rather as sui generis-a Buberean Thou, with whom our relation-
ship is not consciously like our relationship with any other. (Whether 
love, trust, or any other social interaction is possible at either of these 
conceptual limits is a nice question.) 
I take it as given that in ordinary life we live near those limits 
only intermittently. If we are demographers, actuaries, economists, 
political philosophers, or strategic planners of any sort, we regularly 
think of others as high-level abstractions, but we also spend a great 
deal of our time in much more concrete dealings with colleagues, 
students, clients, and friends. There are outliers, of course-people 
who seem lost at one extreme or the other: the mystic lost in meditation 
so concrete that it is ineffable, the theorist who is unable to remember 
the way to his office or the names of his children. But I take it that 
most of us, in most of our sustained interactions, in both the public 
and the private aspects of our lives, live nearer to the middle than to 
the limits of abstraction or concreteness. 
Even midrange interactions, however, can differ dramatically in 
their concreteness in ways that we would like to control. Once the IRS 
agent begins to audit my return, and even before she interviews me, 
she has a disturbingly concrete picture of me. A close friend may have 
a disappointingly abstract picture of how I teach or write. Implausible 
as it seems, even a theory of justice, or an econometric model, may be 
too abstract for its own good. So there is routinely a normative question 
here about the appropriateness of a given level of abstraction or con-
creteness in a given setting. 
In some cases, there is a loose conceptual connection between the 
kind of human interaction involved and the degree of concreteness it 
requires. How much abstractness, for example, is consistent with the 
claim that I love you? If I love you solely because you instantiate a 
(long) list of attractive properties (intelligence, wit, generosity, cheer-
fulness, a hard body, a strong libido, etc.), then in what sense can I 
be said to love you in particular? Would I not "love" just anyone I 
came across who had those properties? And love her in exactly the 
same way? (Call this the adulterer's lament.) 
That ancient puzzle about 10ve14 has a parallel in the area of trust. 
The parallel is this: how much abstractness, in my dealings with you, 
is consistent with the claim that I trust you? If I think of your motiva-
14. Plato, Symposium, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (New York: Bollingen, 1961), 2 lOa ff. 
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tions (and my own) very abstractly, trust may appear to be a puzzling 
phenomenon. 
Consider the abstraction mentioned earlier: that all human moti-
vation can be captured under the single heading of self-interest, when 
that is not confused with psychological egoism. The idea is simply that 
everything we do is ultimately a case of pursuing our own inter-
ests-whether those interests are egoistic, altruistic, perfectionistic, or 
whatever. Now, if we think of human motivation in that very abstract 
way, then it is clear that we need knowledge and power in order to 
pursue our interests effectively, and we are led to think of trust as 
something we employ when we lack those things: when we do not 
have all the knowledge we need, we sometimes fall back on credulity 
and operate on the basis of what others say; when we do not have all 
the power we need, we sometimes fall back into dependence on others 
and rely on their powers. Since we are all less than omniscient and 
omnipotent, some amounts of credulity and reliance initially seem to 
be a practical necessity. But oddly, on further reflection, it is not clear 
how they even get into the picture. It is not clear how any rationally 
defensible form of trust would even differ, conceptually, from knowl-
edge or power. Trust has been eliminated. 
Consider: either I can compute the risk that what you say will be 
incorrect or I cannot. If I can, then what more do I need (beyond 
power) in order to pursue my interests with you in situations where 
you have offered to supply me with information? Specifically, what 
would credulity add to my effectiveness in that case? It seems super-
fluous at best, and at worst a recipe for undermining rational decision 
making. Nor is it clear why credulity would be a useful thing in cases 
in which I cannot compute the risk. It seems even less worthwhile in 
those cases, because it might dispose me to blind myself to my igno-
rance rather than to incorporate my awareness of it into my decisions. 
Note that a disposition to trust only the trustworthy (i.e., in this con-
text, only those whose behavior one can reliably predict) is not an 
alternative here. It is equivalent to the cases in which one heaps trust 
on top of knowledge, adding nothing useful to the pursuit of one's 
interests. What is important is that I am able to act in the face of 
uncertainty and act in a way that is strategically defensible. That may 
take courage, but it is hard to see why it must or should require 
credulity. 
The situation is similar for the disposition to rely on others: either 
I can compute the risks of depending upon you in situations of interest 
to me or I cannot. In either case, reliance as something distinct from 
merely being disposed to make strategically defensible choices, and 
having the courage to carry them out, is either superfluous or danger-
ous. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for security about people's 
motives. 
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The result is that, at this level of abstraction about human motiva-
tion, trust disappears. It is either made synonymous with the knowl-
edge and power we can gain through strategically defensible thinking 
or dismissed. 15 Either way, I believe, we obscure something that makes 
a certain form of trust intensely interesting for political theory. To 
remove the obscurity, we need to do two things: to explore the notion 
of noncognitive trust and to give a little more concreteness to our 
account of human motivation. 
NONCOGNITIVE TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 
To say that we trust others in a noncognitive way is to say that we 
are disposed to be trustful of them independently of our beliefs or 
expectations about their trustworthiness. In some cases we remain 
trustful (credulous, reliant, secure) despite our belief that others do 
not deserve our trust; in other cases the issue does not arise because 
we simply do not attend to it. Trust of this sort is not only a way of 
handling uncertainty; it is also a way of being, a way of going, in 
uncertain or certain terrain. It is one of many possible general struc-
tures of concrete motivation, attitude, affect, and emotion. 
Noncognitive trust is a common phenomenon. Severely abused 
children and adults can develop intense attachments to their tormen-
tors. Some deeply religious people achieve a serenity about human 
affairs that persists through horror upon horror. In ordinary life there 
is massive anecdotal evidence that most of us have personal relation-
ships in which we remain trustful despite the known untrustworthiness 
of others. Whether this is with an unfaithful spouse, an alcoholic lover, 
a backbiting friend, a vindictive boss, an incompetent coworker, or a 
child who is rotten to the bone, it is not uncommon for people to be 
both vividly aware of the problem in reflective moments and helplessly 
credulous, reliant, or secure in action. 
Nor is this sort of trust limited to intensely personal relationships. 
Con games operate on the premise that everyone can be had. Bait 
and switch is a persistently successful sales technique. Used car 
salesmen, who operate in an environment in which the common wis-
dom is that they cannot be trusted, have successful techniques for 
eliciting enough noncognitive trust to close deals that a wary customer 
15. The 1960s dustup, in the pages of Ethics, between Virginia Held and Gordon 
Tullock illustrates nicely how philosophers try to resist this. Held, along with a number 
of other prominent philosophers, wanted to characterize Prisoner's Dilemmas as pre-
senting us with a problem about trust precisely because the prisoners face uncertainties 
rather than calculable risks. Tullock wanted to define problems of trust in terms of 
rational decisions about the trustworthiness of others and thus thought Prisoner's Dilem-
mas were not about trust. For a summary of this, and relevant references, see Virginia 
Held, "On the Meaning of Trust," Ethics 78 (1968): 156-59. 
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would reject. And more to the point here, though polls frequently 
report that belief in the trustworthiness of our social and political 
institutions (i.e., cognitive trust) has steadily declined in the last few 
decades, it is not obvious at all that noncognitive trust in them has 
declined in a comparable way. Many people continue to use those 
institutions in what appears to be a remarkably unguarded way-re-
sponding with bewilderment and outrage when it becomes evident 
that some others are so distrustful and alienated that they are willing 
to bomb public buildings or arm themselves against the government. 
The striking difference in the general public response in the 
United States to three recent events can plausibly be interpreted along 
these lines. The World Trade Center bombing in 1992 was initially 
very disturbing but ultimately came to reinforce people's confidence 
in government rather than diminish it. "Outsiders" were immediately 
identified as the perpetrators and quickly caught. Government agen-
cies mobilized effectively to restore business as usual, and the media 
coverage returned to low intensity very soon. By contrast, the pro-
tracted siege and final raid on the Branch Davidians near Waco, Texas 
(1993), carried out by federal officials in the full glare of saturation 
TV coverage, was from its beginning widely regarded as having been 
managed in an incompetent and duplicitous way. The site has become 
something of a shrine for conspiracy theorists in the so-called militia 
movement, for whom it also became unambiguous proof of the malev-
olence of the government. 16 Yet it did not become a national obsession 
or appear to cause a general disturbance in people's sense of security 
about the motives of public officials. What did become a national 
obsession for over a month was the bombing of the federal building 
in Oklahoma City (April 19, 1995), in large part because it was appar-
ently a response to the Waco raid-a response most citizens considered 
to reveal a shocking and pathological distrust of the motives of govern-
ment officials. How are we to interpret this other than to say that most 
citizens of the United States are disposed to feel secure about the 
motives of their public officials in a way that survives receiving a great 
deal of information about the incompetence, mendacity, greed, and 
so forth, of some of them? How are we to interpret this other than 
to say that those citizens have a good deal of noncognitive trust in 
their government? 
N ow there are obviously wide individual differences among us in 
the types and degrees of this non cognitive trust. Whether such trust 
is wholly learned or partly hardwired is an interesting empirical ques-
tion. Whether some, but not all, of the varieties of noncognitive trust 
that we find among ourselves are strategically defensible traits for an 
16. Michael Kelly, "The Road to Paranoia," The New Yorker (June 19, 1995): 60-75. 
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individual to have is an important line of inquiry. And whether some 
schematic form of noncognitive trust contributes to inclusive genetic 
fitness is also interesting. But I want to address a separate set of 
questions: what type and degree of noncognitive trust, if any, is neces-
sary for effective government of various forms or for sustained, collec-
tive action in general? 
It seems clear that the answers to those questions are not wholly 
derivative from answers to the strategic or genetic ones. The latter 
are obviously relevant to the former, since it is plausible to think that 
we would, in the long run, resist, disrupt, or alter social practices 
that are inconsistent with strategic rationality or inclusive fitness. The 
thought is that social institutions could not survive or be stable unless 
they were fundamentally consistent with genetic and widely exhibited 
motivational structures. The history of governments, however, is in 
large part the history of resistance to them, not only in the form of 
active rebellion but also in the form of evasion and avoidance. Many 
(most?) governments are not stable for long, unless they have ways of 
routinely accommodating rebels and noncooperators. Does that mean 
that there is a persistent conflict between the level of trust required 
by effective governments and the level we are disposed to give? It may 
be that different forms of government depend on different types and 
levels of noncognitive trust, some of which are strategically defensible 
(given the existence of the government) and others of which are not. 
But it is not at all clear a priori that our favored form of government 
(say, liberal democracy) depends on a type and degree of noncognitive 
trust that is inclusively fit, strategically defensible, or learnable in 
this life. 
SECURITY AND CONCRETE MOTIVATION 
In sorting out the kinds of noncognitive trust that might be of most 
interest, I am struck by several things. One is the way we seem to need 
(psychologically) a sense of security to an extent that we do not appear 
to need credulity and reliance in their noncognitive forms. 17 Another 
is the way governments, too, if they depend on noncognitive trust at 
all, seem to depend most of all on security. (More about that appears 
below.) Still another is the attention given to a particular trio of motiva-
tions relevant to security-attention found both in moral philosophy 
and in social science when it abandons the wide self-interest abstraction. 
In moral philosophy unitary accounts of human motivation are 
typically put aside. The practical importance of narrow self-interest 
(i.e., concern for one's own welfare) is assumed. But as Joseph Butler 
argued convincingly long ago, the difference between benevolence 
17. Maslow, pp. 39 ff. 
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and narrow self-interest is as important as their similarity.18 Conscien-
tiousness (concern or respect for following the moral "law" for its own 
sake) is also widely recognized as an importantly distinct motive. And 
some of us think that reciprocity, or perhaps fairness or fair play, 
should be equally central to an account of our moral psychology. In 
any case, moral philosophy attends to the ways in which all of those 
things and a host of other motivational structures (projects, commit-
ments, ends) play out with or against narrow self-interest. The situa-
tion in social and behavioral science seems parallel whenever the wide 
self-interest abstraction is dropped: narrow self-interest is assumed, 
and attention shifts to the ways in which altruism, norms of reciprocity, 
and other motivational structures operate with or against it. 
My impression is that, when these moral philosophers or social 
scientists turn their attention to trust, they regularly see that confi-
dence about others' motives, especially their benevolence and commit-
ment to justice, is a central issue. 19 These scholars readily recognize 
what I have called the noncognitive dimension of this form of trust. 
It may be wishful thinking, but I believe my preferred account of 
security-as noncognitive confidence about the benevolence, consci-
entiousness, and reciprocity of others-is merely an explication ofthis 
rough consensus. 
Given an interest in security, however, why should this trio of 
traits be singled out for inquiry? Why not include honesty, for exam-
ple, or loyalty, temperance, or courage on the list? Do we not feel 
even more secure when we are confident that others have all those 
motives? Why not include the whole inventory of conventional virtues? 
And if not the full list, then why this short one in particular? 
The answer is that I am interested here in identifying a core of 
traits that are connected directly to our ability to feel secure in our 
independent transactions with others-in those transactions in which 
our lack of knowledge or power does not figure centrally, and thus 
issues of trust in the sense of credulity or reliance are not prominent. 
When we are ignorant or powerless (say, in a public health or safety 
emergency), and thereby dependent on others, then admittedly their 
honesty, competence, and courage are relevant to whether we feel 
secure about dealing with them. But it is also true that in cases like 
these, our sense of security is usually rather beside the point. What 
the emergency management people need to do their work is merely 
our credulity and compliance for the duration of the emergency. What 
interests me is what happens when such periods of substantial igno-
18. Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons, ed. T. A. Roberts (1726; London: Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1970). 
19. Baier, "Trust and Antitrust"; Yamagishi and Yamagishi. 
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rance and dependency (including childhood and illness) are over, and 
we are routinely dealing with public officials and each other more or 
less independently. Perhaps then we begin to suspect that our earlier 
credulity and reliance had been misplaced. (Think of the continuing 
revelations from cold-war Department of Energy and Department of 
Defense files that show how ignorant the experts were in the 1950s 
about the hazards of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons re-
search.) It strikes me as a plausible hypothesis, however, that demo-
cratic government is not seriously disabled by a consequent decline in 
people's credulity and reliance, as long as they continue to believe that 
officials generally mean well, play by the rules, and play fair. When 
we feel secure about that much, we tend to write off incompetence, 
mendacity, greed, and cowardice as simply human foibles. In emergen-
cies, when we again recognize our ignorance and lack of power, we 
can easily enough be persuaded to follow evacuation orders. What we 
cannot ignore is evidence that officials do not mean well, do not play 
by the rules, and do not play fair. When we lose that sort of confidence, 
we are likely to become very wary indeed-perhaps to disengage from 
"the system," or to try to bring it down. Effective government needs 
that kind of trust. (Or so goes my hypothesis.) It may be that we would 
feel most secure in the presence of a moral saint-one who possessed 
every virtue to the highest degree. 2o But I suggest that a more modest 
form of security is all that could plausibly be necessary for effective 
political institutions. 
BENEVOLENCE, CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, AND RECIPROCITY 
The nature of the motivational structure at issue here is still somewhat 
obscure. Let me go over a few definitional matters and formulate some 
assumptions and hypotheses to clarify them. 
A. Benevolence 
'Benevolence' is used here simply as shorthand for one person's con-
cern for, or interest in, the welfare of others. It varies along at least 
five important dimensions: scope, magnitude, distribution, activity, 
and imposition. Each of them poses interesting descriptive and norma-
tive problems. 
Scope. - The reach of one's benevolence can be universal (a con-
cern for the welfare of all beings that can logically be the objects of 
such concern), or it can be limited (e.g., to sentient creatures, to benign 
sentient creatures, to benign members of the moral community, to 
benign fellow citizens, etc.). I assume that our sense of security about 
the motives of others is connected not only to whether we behave as 
20. But see Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-39. 
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if we ourselves are within the scope of their benevolence but also to 
whether we behave as if it includes everything we ourselves have (or 
might have) a benevolent interest in-for example, our families, 
friends, and so on. So the hypothesis would be that we do (and should) 
feel more secure the more we are disposed to behave as if the scope 
of others' benevolence exceeds our own (first by including us, of 
course), up to the point that it includes everything our own benevo-
lence might come to include. (That limit will obviously vary from 
person to person.) 
Magnitude. - The relative magnitude of people's benevolence may 
be thought of in terms of the power it has to dominate their other 
motives in a given context. (1 happily leave aside the question of 
whether we can construct a useful concept of its absolute magnitude.) 
The logical range here is from impotence to omnipotence. For practi-
cal purposes, however, if people's benevolent motives were omnipo-
tent, exceeded our own in scope, and were likely to preempt our 
own decisions, we might reasonably regard them as dangerous. My 
hypothesis is that, in a political context at least, we do (and should) feel 
most secure when we are disposed to behave as if others' benevolence, 
conscientiousness, and reciprocity are of roughly equal magnitude in 
their lives. 
Distribution. - Within its reach, the magnitude of my benevolence 
may be uniform or variable. A typical pattern is some sort of "radiat-
ing" benevolence, which is most powerful for those 1 define as "close" 
and which grows weaker with distance. But an utterly uniform distribu-
tion has sometimes apparently been recommended. (1 say "apparently" 
because it is often the critics of a moral theory who are most eager to 
force this interpretation of it. Think of the standard attacks on the 
impartiality required by utilitarianism. Nonetheless, advocates do oc-
casionally give the critics a clear text.)2! My assumption is that people 
and institutions generally operate with radiant distributions that are 
context dependent. Sometimes the radiance will be limited by a sharp 
outsider/insider boundary forced by an enterprise (e.g., a competitive 
or adversarial undertaking). Most political contexts force a fairly steep 
decline in the signal beyond the boundaries defined by citizenship, 
legal residence, and hospitality. Nonetheless, a radiating pattern can 
be the source of considerable insecurity. Just as being outside the scope 
of others' benevolence is disturbing, so too is the sense that their 
concern for you is too remote or weak. My hypothesis is that, in a 
given cooperative enterprise, we are most secure when we are disposed 
21. William Godwin, "Political Justice," in Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and 
Its Influence on Morals and Happiness, ed. F. E. L. Priestley (1798; Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1946), bk. 2, chap. 2. 
56 Ethics October 1996 
to behave as if the others in it with us are uniformly benevolent to 
all participants. 
Activity. - Benevolence is active to the extent that the benevolent 
person takes the initiative in assessing and contributing to the welfare 
of others, reactive insofar as the person assesses and contributes only 
in response to others' initiatives, and passive insofar as the benevolent 
person simply wishes others well and does nothing to either help or 
hinder them. Other things being equal, I assume we do and should 
prefer active to reactive and reactive to passive. . 
Imposition. - People whose benevolence is active or reactive, how-
ever, face the questions of whether, when, and how to impose their 
help on others. These questions of so-called paternalistic intervention 
are among the most vexing in ethics, including political philosophy. 
My assumption is that partly because we are often divided about these 
matters, we are rightly apprehensive about being preempted by others' 
benevolence. My hypothesis is that confidence in others' conscientious-
ness is needed to make us feel secure on this score. 
B. Conscientiousness 
By 'conscientiousness' I mean the disposition to carryon a given activ-
ity on its own terms, by following its own internal rules understood 
in terms of its own point or purpose. The disposition to follow the 
etiquette of various social situations is an example. If we accept a 
wedding invitation and want to help make the wedding a success for 
everyone involved, then much of the purpose of the event and the 
standards of right conduct for participants and observers will have 
been fixed for us by the sort of wedding it will be. We will conscien-
tiously follow those rules rather than our own preferred ones, and we 
will dutifully not over- or underdress, not snicker at the music or 
readings or vows, and not complain about anything at all in the hearing 
of the families. When we are in doubt about what the correct behavior 
would be in some particular, we will think about it in terms internal 
to the practice-in terms of the purposes of the sort of wedding it is 
going to be. 
lt is evident that conscientiousness, in this sense, is always tied to 
rule- or norm-governed activities. lt cannot be free-form. And it is 
always deontological-a matter of what is right, correct, or good form 
within a normative structure treated as a given. Conscientious people 
are disposed to operate within the rules of the game in play. Moreover, 
they are disposed to operate by rules. That means their behavior will 
be principled and take the form of treating similar cases similarly, 
though of course this does not guarantee itsjustice.22 Note, however, 
22. Chaim Perelman,justice, Law, and Argument: Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning 
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), pp. 34-43. 
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that conscientiousness is not equivalent to the sort of competence that 
underwrites our willingness to rely or depend upon others. Nor should 
the two be joined for analytic purposes. Competence connects with 
the issue of reliance, not security. 
We should resist the temptation to moralize this disposition here.23 
Unmoralized, of course, it is obviously not a trait that the heroes of 
Romanticism and moral autonomy exhibit. Moreover, if the game in 
play is evil, it is common to regard its conscientious players with special 
horror or contempt-even when their conformity to the rules has the 
demonstrable effect of limiting the evil or opening the way for reform. 
When we address the good of this trait in our lives, then, there is 
impetus to think of its value conditionally-as dependent on the value 
of the game being played. This translates into a reluctance to think 
that the wisdom of trusting in people's conscientiousness could wisely 
be separated from the justice or goodness of their enterprise. 
My assumption, however, is that our sense of security in our 
dealings with others is (and ought to be) in large measure dependent 
on a wholly unmoralized notion of conscientiousness. It is and ought 
to be dependent on a disposition to behave as if (1) any situation we 
find ourselves in will be a norm-governed activity, (2) we will be able 
to understand, quickly enough for our purposes, what those norms 
are, and (3) the others involved in the situation are generally going 
to be acting in accord with the rules.24 
C. Reciprocity 
'Reciprocity', as I use it here, is also an unmoralized notion. It refers 
simply to the disposition to make fitting and proportionate responses 
to the good or ill we receive at the hands of others. A fitting response 
is one of the same general kind-good for good, evil for evil, indiffer-
ence for indifference-where the standard of sameness is established 
either by social convention, agreement between the parties, or the 
standards of the individual making the response. A proportionate 
response is one of the same magnitude, as measured either by the 
giver's cost or the recipient's benefit. 
It is very hard to find functional human beings who lack a disposi-
tion to reciprocate, and it is equally difficult to find societies that lack 
elaborate norms of reciprocity. It is easy, however, to find startling 
varieties in these dispositions and norms (servility, vengefulness, soci-
opathy, potlatch, vendetta). The range is so wide and the practices are 
23. By 'moralize', here, I mean an effort to define a practice or disposition in a 
way that makes it normatively acceptable from one's favored moral point of view, 
however defined. 
24. Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, N.].: Prentice-
Hall, 1967), pp. 76-103. 
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so potent that there is very good reason to try to sort out the rationally 
defensible versions-or the ones that conform to one's favored con-
cept of justice, fairness, utility, or moral duty. Thus we find moralized 
notions of reciprocity that restrict its scope, rule out revenge, put a 
cap on the magnitude of proportionate responses, and so on.25 
A discussion of noncognitive trust, however, is best served by an 
unmoralized concept of reciprocity. My assumption is that, like trust 
in others' conscientiousness, trust in their reciprocity consists partly 
of a disposition to behave as if their behavior will be norm governed 
in an understandable way-a way we can adapt to even if it is bizarre. 
Like trust in others' benevolence, trust in their reciprocity consists 
partly of a disposition to behave as if others will benefit us in certain 
situations. But unlike either benevolence or conscientiousness, trust 
in others' reciprocity gives us some sense of control-control over the 
operation of these norms and the receipt of these benefits. The 
thought that public officials are reciprocators is no doubt more com-
forting to people with good credit histories than to those with bad 
ones. But even bankrupts can get back on track by proffering benefits 
to people disposed to reciprocate. When we come to behave as if 
nothing good that we can do will ever be reciprocated in any way, we 
come quickly to a crisis. Some of us learn helplessness and alienation. 
Others learn intractable rebelliousness. Either way, the results for 
social organizations are not good. 
THE TRUSTING SOUL 
A proper sense of security is a balance of cognitive control and noncog-
nitive stability. That is, it is a balance between our ability to maneuver 
in response to our beliefs about the nature of what we are doing (our 
cognitive control of our conduct) and our resistance to being driven 
by the shifting winds of our beliefs (our noncognitive stability). When 
we have perfect cognitive control over our dispositions, we no longer 
have anything worth calling a disposition; we are simply untethered 
rational actors in an atmosphere of possibilities. When we have per-
fectly stable dispositions, we no longer have anything worth calling 
control; we simply follow the trajectory determined by our disposi-
tions, unable to maneuver at all in response to our contrary beliefs 
about goals or circumstances. 
The analogy here is from aeronautical engineering in fixed-wing 
aircraft.26 An airplane is said to have positive stability if it stays in or 
returns to straight and level flight unless pressure is continuously 
applied to the controls. It has neutral stability when it holds any given 
25. Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity (New York: Routledge, 1986). 
26. I am indebted to Robert Hansen for discussion of these matters. 
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attitude (roll, pitch, yaw) in which it is placed-tending neither to 
exaggerate that attitude nor to return to straight and level flight. It 
has negative stability when it deviates from any given flight attitude 
unless corrective control is continuously applied. 
At the limit of positive or negative stability, an aircraft is uncon-
trollable. Its optimal level of control and stability, however, is largely 
determined by its purpose. If it is designed as a trainer for novice 
pilots, a significant amount of positive stability is a desirable trait. If 
it is a high-performance fighter with computer-assisted controls, even 
some negative stability may be a tolerable trade-off for other charac-
teristics. 
What is the proper balance of stability and control for noncogni-
tive trust?27 Clearly, we want to be able to maneuver in response to 
information about the untrustworthiness of others. A noncognitively 
trustful disposition will resist such maneuvers. How much resistance 
is optimal? And when we do override the resistance, finish our strategic 
maneuvers, and release the controls, then what? A noncognitive dispo-
sition is presumably malleable to some degree-that is, it can presum-
ably be erased or altered by experience. What is the optimal level of 
such malleability? How fixed should our trustful dispositions be? And 
in cases when we do not want our strategic maneuvering to alter them, 
how quickly and fully should they reestablish our trustfulness? How 
much tractable power should they have? 
The answers to such questions, both normative and descriptive, 
will depend on several matters. For one thing, it appears (e.g., from 
the discussion of the Waco and Oklahoma City cases) that malleability 
in noncognitive security is more problematic than malleability in the 
dispositions to be credulous or reliant. This is so, in part, because 
when others breach our trust in their motives-breach our confidence 
that they are benevolent, conscientious, and reciprocating-we typi-
cally respond in ways that are much more volatile and disruptive of 
social relations than we do when people prove to be merely unreliable 
or not credible. Thus, a highly malleable form of noncognitive security 
poses a significant risk that does not attend malleability in our other 
trustful dispositions. 28 
Moreover, answers to questions-about optimal levels of malleabil-
ity will depend on the agenda behind the questions. (1) Whose trust? 
In the context of governments, the question is usually put in terms 
of citizens trusting officials. But two other areas are equally interesting: 
the extent to which officials trust each other (to keep secrets, be loyal, 
carry out orders, use discretion properly, etc.) and the extent to which 
27. H. J. N. Horsburgh, "Trust and Social Objectives," Ethics 72 (1961): 28-40. 
28. I thank John Deigh for this point. 
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officials trust citizens (e.g., with civil liberties). (2) In what kind of 
government? It is often observed that different polities appear to 
require different levels of trust in order to sustain themselves. Modern 
dictators, for example, as well as the ruling elites in command econo-
mies have often exhibited obsessive concern for maintaining the cre-
dulity and dependence of their citizens and civil servants, while simulta-
neously exhibiting extreme distrust of them. By contrast, the ruling 
elites in liberal democracies and open-market economies seem able to 
tolerate a great deal of incredulity in their citizenries. Moreover, they 
actively discourage citizens' dependence on government in many areas 
and exhibit a good deal of trust in other citizens and civil servants. 
(3) In what kind of governmental activity? Again, in some areas the 
need for credulity and reliance appears to be much greater than in 
others. Compare the judiciary with, say, campaigning incumbent poli-
ticians, or compare social service agencies with intelligence agencies. 
(4) In what kind of environment? In crises of various sorts (war, fam-
ine, economic depression, etc.), reliance may be forced. In general, it 
may be that things like the size of the stakes, the need for expertise, 
the amount of public participation in voluntary social organizations, 
and so on, affect the need for trust in a systematic way. 
In any case, finding optimal levels of resistance, malleability, and 
tractive power in our trustful dispositions will obviously depend on 
all the matters just mentioned. Framing empirical hypotheses and 
normative arguments on these issues is an intriguing prospect that I 
cannot pursue here. I will make only two brief and speculative sug-
gestions. 
One is that, at their optimal levels, resistance and tractive power 
in noncognitive security will not vary from case to case nearly as much 
or as frequently as in the optimal levels of credulity and reliance. To 
return to the aeronautical analogy, airplanes operate in three dimen-
sions and can be stable or unstable around all three axes. I am told 
that in some aircraft designs, instability around one axis can be coupled 
with instability in the others-so that a roll, for example, may generate 
a yaw as well and may then quickly yield a rather colorful situation. 
Noncognitive trust operates in at least three dimensions also, and it 
seems plausible that instability in one might be coupled with instability 
in the others, with an equally colorful result. 
My thought is that security presents more of a problem in this 
regard than either credulity or reliance. When I lack security about 
the motives of others, I am as a consequence likely to lose both my 
willingness to believe what they say and my willingness to depend on 
them. But the causal connection seems much less firm in the other 
direction: my sense of security about motives is not damaged by others' 
lies or mistakes insofar as I construe them as well meant or innocent. 
(As Justice Holmes famously remarked, "Even a dog distinguishes 
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between being stumbled over and being kicked.")29 So the disposition 
to feel secure about the motives of others can withstand a good deal 
of instability in the others, but the reverse may not be true. That is 
reason enough to pay close attention to this form of trust. 
The other suggestion is that at its optimal level noncognitive secu-
rity is not malleable at all. In "Papa Doc" Duvalier's Haiti, it is good 
to be on guard. It does not follow that its inhabitants should learn 
the sort of attitudinal insecurity that would make a life in Sweden 
unnecessarily miserable-or socially volatile. Thus, it may be fruitful 
to think of the optimal level of trust (in political contexts) as being 
constituted by nonmalleable, noncognitive security, steered by cogni-
tive trust of all three sorts (credulity, reliance, security). In support of 
this, I note simply that there does not seem to be anything to be gained 
by making our noncognitive security even a little bit malleable as long 
as its resistance and tractive power are properly calibrated and as 
long as it can be steered cognitively. Moreover, it may be that stable 
government depends on the ability of political actors to elicit such 
noncognitive security in others. If so, and if political actors are gener-
ally untrustworthy by cognitive standards, a malleable version of the 
trait will not long survive. We may be best served by a trustful disposi-
tion that survives perpetual disappointment. 
29. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, vol. 3 of The Collected Works of 
Justice Holmes: Complete Public Writings and Selected Judicial Opinions, ed. Sheldon M. 
Novick (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 116. 
